We study the communication complexity of secure function evaluation (SFE). Consider a setting where Alice has a short input xA, Bob has an input xB and we want Bob to learn some function y = f (xA, xB) with large output size. For example, Alice has a small secret decryption key, Bob has a large encrypted database and we want Bob to learn the decrypted data without learning anything else about Alice's key. In a trivial insecure protocol, Alice can just send her short input xA to Bob. However, all known SFE protocols have communication complexity that scales with size of the output y, which can potentially be much larger. Is such "output-size dependence" inherent in SFE? Surprisingly, we show that output-size dependence can be avoided in the honest-but-curious setting. In particular, using indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) and fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), we construct the first honestbut-curious SFE protocol whose communication complexity only scales with that of the best insecure protocol for evaluating the desired function, independent of the output size. Our construction relies on a novel way of using iO via a new tool that we call a "somewhere statistically binding (SSB) hash", and which may be of independent interest.
INTRODUCTION
We study the communication complexity of secure function evaluation (SFE). For simplicity, we focus on the case of a two-party functionality y = f (xA, xB), where Alice and Bob start with inputs xA, xB respectively and we want Bob to learn the output y. Alice should not learn anything about Bob's input xB or the output y, and Bob should not learn anything about Alice's input xA beyond learning the output y = f (xA, xB).
Traditional approaches to SFE, for example based on Yao garbled circuits [24] , have communication complexity which is proportional to the circuit size of the function f . The breakthrough results on fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE) by Gentry [13] and follow-up works (e.g., [8, 7, 15] ) gave the first general SFE solutions whose communication complexity is independent of the circuit size of f , and only scales with the input and output size of f .
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Communication Complexity of SFE using FHE. Using FHE, we can get SFE solutions whose communication complexity only scales with the input and output size of the function f being computed. For example, in the honestbut-curious setting, we get a solution where Bob encrypts his input xB to Alice via a compact and circuit-private FHE for which he knows the secret key, Alice then runs the computation homomorphically on the received ciphertext and her input xA to get an encryption of y which she sends back to Bob, and Bob decrypts and learns y. This achieves communication complexity that scales with |xB| + |y|. Alternatively, we can get a similar protocol with communication complexity that scales with |xA| + |y|.
More generally, we can take any insecure protocol evaluating a function f with low communication complexity and convert it into a secure protocol as follows. Alice and Bob first run a secure distributed key-generation protocol for an FHE scheme, which gives them a common publickey pk and secret-shares skA, skB of the secret key sk = skA ⊕ skB. They then encrypt their inputs under pk and execute the insecure protocol for evaluating f , by running it homomorphically under the FHE scheme, so that Bob eventually learns an encryption of the output y. Alice and Bob can then run a secure distributed decryption procedure using their shares skA, skB and the encryption of y so that Bob learns the decrypted output y (but nothing else). The distributed key-generation and decryption protocols can be implemented generically using an arbitrary SFE scheme. 2 If there exists an efficient protocol π evaluating f without any security requirements with communication complexity CC(π) and λ is the security parameter, then the above approach yields an SFE with communication complexity poly(λ)(CC(π)+|y|) where the poly(λ) term is some fixed polynomial independent of the function f . Moreover, using succinct zero-knowledge arguments of Kilian [21] , we can even make the above protocols secure in the fully malicious setting without asymptotically increasing the communication complexity.
However, in all known SFE protocols, including the abovedescribed solutions, the communication complexity of the protocol exceeds the output size |y| of the computation. We say that such protocols have "output-size dependence". As the main question of the paper, we ask if output-size dependence is inherent in SFE.
Is output-size dependence inherent in SFE? If we didn't require any security, then there is a trivial protocol where Alice just sends her input xA to Bob who computes y = f (xA, xB) himself, with communication |xA| independent of the output size |y|. Can we achieve this type of efficiency while maintaining security? For example, imagine that Alice has a short seed x for a pseudorandom generator (PRG) G, Bob does not have any input, and we want Bob to learn a huge PRG output y = G(x). Can we do this with communication complexity which only depends on |x| but not on |y|? Alternatively, imagine Alice has a small secret decryption key sk, Bob has a large encrypted database c = Enc pk (DB) and we want Bob to learn the plaintext database DB = Dec sk (c) without learning anything else about sk. Can we do this with communication complexity independent of |DB|? In all of these cases, we would like to have an SFE protocol that avoids output-size dependence.
Our Results. On the negative side, we show that outputsize dependence is inherent for SFE in the fully malicious setting. In fact, it is already required even in an honest-butdeterministic setting, where the corrupted party follows the protocol as specified but fixes its random tape to some deterministic value (say, all 0s). More specifically, we show that in any honest-but-deterministic SFE scheme, the communication from Alice to Bob must exceed the "Yao incompressibility entropy" of Bob's output conditioned on his input, and in general, this can be as large as Bob's output size. Moreover, we extend this result to protocols in the offline/online setting, where the parties can run an offline phase before knowing their inputs. 3 We show that, no matter how much communication takes place in the offline phase, the com-munication of the online phase must still satisfy output-size dependence. This negative result uses an "incompressibility argument" which has been used in several recent works giving negative results and/or lower bounds for functional encryption, garbled circuits and some classes of SFE [3, 1, 10, 16, 14, 22] . Our main contribution is to give a (relatively straightforward) generalization of this technique to prove lower bounds on the communication complexity of general SFE, and then show that all of the prior uses of this technique follow as simple corollaries of our general theorem.
On the positive side, we show that output-size dependence can surprisingly be avoided in the honest-but-curious setting. In particular, using indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) and fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE), we construct the first general honest-but-curious SFE protocols that avoid output-size dependence. We give two such protocols for evaluating an arbitrary function f where Bob learns the output. The first protocol achieves communication poly(λ) + |xA|, where xA is Alice's input. The second protocol takes any insecure protocol π for evaluating f and compiles it into a secure protocol that achieves communication poly(λ)CC(π) which only scales with the communicationcomplexity CC(π) of the protocol π. In both cases, the poly(λ) term is some fixed polynomial in the security parameter λ, independent of the function f . Since there is always a simple insecure protocol where Alice sends her input to Bob, we have CC(π) ≤ |xA|, and there are functions for which the gap is large CC(π) |xA|. Therefore the latter protocol may be better in some instances, although it incurs a multiplicative rather than additive overhead in the security parameter. Using either of these protocols, we get an SFE solution to the problem where Bob has a large encrypted database and wants to securely learn the decryption under a short key held by Alice, using communication complexity which is independent of the database size.
Our Techniques: Negative Result
Let us begin by describing the technique behind the negative result. 4 For concreteness, consider a two-party computation protocol where Alice has a secret key k for a pseudorandom function (PRF) f k : N → {0, 1}, Bob does not have any input, and we want Bob to learn the PRF outputs y1 = f k (1), . . . , yL = f k (L) for some large integer L. For contradiction, assume that we had an SFE protocol for this task where the communication complexity from Alice to Bob is L < L bits. Let's look at the case where Alice is honest and has a uniformly random key k as her input, while a corrupted Bob uses an honest-but-deterministic strategy, meaning that he follows the specified protocol but fixes his random tape to some deterministic value (say, all 0s). The security of the SFE protocol implies that there is a simulator which gets Bob's output y1 = f k (1), . . . , yL = f k (L) and must simulate the view of Bob, denoted view Bob . The simulated view Bob consists of messages from Alice to Bob (of size L ) that cause Bob to output y1, . . . , yL. But this means that the simulator can efficiently compress the outputs y1, . . . , yL into a shorter string view Bob of size L < L bits from which we can efficiently recover the output (by running Bob's protocol with the fixed randomness). This in turn contradicts the fact that the outputs are pseudorandom and therefore incompressible, showing that such an SFE cannot exist.
As mentioned, our actual result generalize the above example in several ways. Firstly, we show that the communication from Alice to Bob in any SFE for any function f must exceed the "Yao incompressibility entropy" [25, 19] of Bob's output given Bob's input. In the above example, the incompressibility entropy of the output is L bits. Secondly, we extend this result to protocols in the offline/online setting, where we show that the same lower-bound applies to the online phase, no matter how much communication takes place in the offline phase. In this setting, we require that the simulator can simulate the offline phase before the online inputs are chosen, and therefore without knowing the output of the computation.
Lastly, we show that the above negative result implies many prior lower-bounds on functional encryption and/or (reusable) garbled circuits. In particular, all of these results follow by showing that the desired primitive would immediately yield an SFE protocol (possibly in the offline/online setting) whose communication complexity would beat our lower bound.
Our Techniques: Positive Result
Surprisingly, we show that it is possible to avoid the negative result in the honest-but-curious setting. 5 Before we describe our solution, it is instructive to see where the negative result fails. In the negative result, we relied on the fact that the simulated view of an honest-but-deterministic Bob, denoted view Bob , can be used to reconstruct the output of the function, which consists of pseudorandom values y1 = f k (1), . . . , yL = f k (L). Since this view only contained the communication from Alice to Bob, which we assumed to be shorter than the output size L, this served as a compression of the output leading to a contradiction. In the "honest-but-curious" setting, the view of Bob also contains all of his random coins used during the protocol execution, which may be arbitrarily long. Therefore, in this setting, view Bob is no longer compressing even if the communication complexity is small, and the negative result fails.
At first it may appear that the above observation cannot help us. In the real protocol execution, Bob's coins are truly random and independent of the output; how can we use the random coins to represent/reconstruct the output y1, . . . , yL? We rely on the fact that the simulator can choose the "simulated random coins" for Bob in a way that is not truly random, and in fact can somehow embed into the random coins information about the outputs y1, . . . , yL, while still making the coins appear random to a distinguisher.
We now describe our positive result in several steps, focusing on the above example of PRF evaluation for concreteness. This high-level overview doesn't match the actual constructions in the paper, but it elucidates the main ideas.
First Attempt: Just Obfuscate. As a first attempt, consider a protocol where Alice constructs a small circuit C k (i) with a hard-coded key k which gets as input an in-dex i ∈ {1, . . . , L} and outputs f k (i). Alice obfuscates this circuit and sends it to Bob who then evaluates it on the values 1, . . . , L to get his output. Since the size of the circuit is independent of L (ignoring logarithmic factors), so is the communication complexity of this protocol. On the positive side, the use of obfuscation might already hide some information about Alice's input k. On the negative side, there is no hope of simulating this protocol. Indeed, since Bob does not send any communication to Alice, there is no difference between proving the security of this protocol for an honestbut-curious Bob vs. a fully malicious Bob, and our negative result rules this out. Second Attempt: Hash Randomness then Obfuscate. Our main idea for overcoming the negative result is to incorporate the random coins of Bob into the protocol. Let's consider the following modification. Bob first chooses L random bits r1, . . . , rL and hashes them using a Merkle Tree to derive z = H(r1, . . . , rL). A Merkle Tree has the property that Bob can efficiently "open" any bit ri of the pre-image by providing a short opening πi. Bob sends the hash z to Alice. Alice now constructs a small circuit C k,z (i, ri, πi) that has k, z hard-coded, gets as input i ∈ {1, . . . , L}, ri ∈ {0, 1} and a short opening πi, verifies that πi is a valid opening of the i'th pre-image bit to ri, and if so outputs f k (i) (if not outputs 0). Alice obfuscates this circuit C k,z and sends it to Bob, who then evaluates it on the values i ∈ {1, . . . , L} by also providing the correct bit ri and the opening πi for each evaluation. The size of the circuit C k,z is independent of L and therefore so is the communication complexity of this protocol.
Notice that Bob commits himself ahead of time to providing some random bits ri to the obfuscated circuit on each evaluation. The circuit checks that it gets the right bit, but then essentially ignores it afterwards. The main idea of the simulation strategy is to choose the random coins ri on behalf of Bob in a way that embeds information about the outputs yi and to change the circuit being obfuscated so that it uses the inputs ri to compute the output without knowing k. The simulator chooses his own PRF key k (unrelated to Alice's key k which the simulator does not know) and sets the simulated random coins to ri := f k (i) ⊕ yi. Then it creates an obfuscation of the circuit C k ,z (i, ri, πi) which checks the opening πi as before, and if the opening is valid, it now outputs ri ⊕ f k (i) instead of f k (i). In both cases, if the circuits C k,z and C k ,z get the correct inputs (i, ri, πi) they produce the same outputs yi.
The indistinguishability of simulation boils down to showing that one cannot distinguish an obfuscation of C k,z and C k ,z even given r1, . . . , rL, k and k , where z = H(r1, . . . , rL). Functionally, these circuits only differ on inputs of the form (i, r i , π i ) where r i = ri differs from the bit that was hashed to create z and π i is a valid opening. By the security of the Merkle Tree, such inputs are hard to find. Therefore, we could already show the security of the above construction by relying on differing-inputs obfuscation (diO) [5, 2, 6] . However, diO is a strong assumption and there is some evidence that it may not hold in general [12] . Therefore, we would like a solution based on the weaker and better studied notion of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) [5, 11] . 6 6 In both notions of obfuscation, we want to ensure that the obfuscations of two different circuits C, C are indistinguishable. For iO, we assume that C, C agree on all inputs, Final Attempt: Hash Carefully and Use iO. It turns out that we can also prove the security of the above construction using only iO, by being more careful and relying on special type of hash function. We believe that this technique may have broader applicability.
Abstracting out the above construction, we have two circuits C, C which have a hard-coded hash-output z = H(r1, . . . , rL) and they only differ on inputs of the type (i, r i , π i ) where r i = ri differs from the hashed bit in position i, and π i is a valid opening for r i . Since the hash is compressing, such inputs necessarily exist. However, we'd like to rely on iO to show that obfuscations of C and C are indistinguishable. We show that we can do this if the hash function satisfies a new notion of security which we call a "somewhere statistically binding" (SSB) hash.
An SSB hash H hk has a short public "hashing key" hk. Just like in a Merkle Tree, we can take z = H hk (r1, . . . , rL) and, for any position i, produce a short opening πi to certify ri as the correct bit of the pre-image in that position. Moreover, there is now a method of choosing the hash key hk with a special "binding index" i * and we require the following two security properties:
• z = H hk (r1, . . . , rL) is statistically binding for position i * , meaning that there does not exist a valid opening π i * that would open position i * to the wrong bit r i * = ri * .
• The hash key hk does not reveal anything about which index i * is the binding index.
We show how to construct such SSB hash functions by combining the idea of a Merkle Tree with fully homomorphic encryption. We believe that this primitive may find other applications.
Using an SSB hash, we show that obfuscations of C and C are indistinguishable via a careful hybrid argument. We can define hybrid circuits Ci * (i, ri, πi) that evaluate C when i ≤ i * and C otherwise, so that C0 = C and CL = C . For i * = 1, . . . , L we define a series of hybrid distributions where we first change the way we choose hk to be binding on index i * and then we change the circuit being obfuscated to Ci * . Each time we change the circuit being obfuscated from Ci * −1 to Ci * , the two circuits being considered are functionally equivalent since the SSB hash is binding on index i * . Therefore, we get a proof of security using only iO rather than diO.
General Result. So far, we described a specific example for our positive result where we avoid output-size dependence in the concrete case of PRF evaluation. However, the above ideas generalize to providing a general honest-butcurious two-party SFE protocol for any function f , so as to achieve the positive results we described previously.
Can Obfuscation be Avoided? We do not know if iO can be avoided in the above positive result but, in the full version, we present some evidence that at least a weak flavor of obfuscation is inherent. It remains an interesting problem to explore this further and to see what are the minimal assumptions under which we can avoid "output-size dependence" in the honest-but-curious setting.
Full Version. This is an extended abstract and the full version of the paper with all proofs appears in [20] .
whereas for diO we only assume that it is computationally infeasible to find an input on which they disagree.
DEFINITIONS FOR SFE
be a function family. We consider the secure function evaluation problem with two parties Alice and Bob, where Alice has a private input xA ∈ {0, 1}
A , Bob has a private input xB ∈ {0, 1} B , and Bob wishes to obtain the evaluation y = f (xA, xB).
Honest-But-Curious SFE. For our positive result, we will rely on the notion of honest-but-curious adversaries, where the adversarial party is assumed to follow the protocol specification completely and hopes to learn some unintended information. For an honest-but-curious Bob, we define a random variable denoting his view of the protocol by view Π B (xA, xB, λ) = (xB, rB, m1, . . . , mt) where rB are the random coins used by Bob, and m1, . . . , mt are the messages from Alice to Bob. We define the view of an honestbut-curious Alice, view Π A (xA, xB, λ), analogously. Definition 1. We say that two-party protocol Π securely evaluates f : {0, 1}
A × {0, 1} B → {0, 1} L in the presence of honest-but-curious adversaries, if there exists a ppt simulator S = (SA, SB) such that for all xA ∈ {0, 1}
A and xB ∈ {0, 1} B it holds that
where sim A,λ ← SA(1 λ , xA) and sim B,λ ← SB(1 λ , xB, f (xA, xB)). We sometimes consider "one-sided" security against honest-but-curious Bob, in which case we only require (2) to hold.
Honest-But-Deterministic SFE. For our negative results, we will rely on a notion of honest-but-deterministic adversaries, where the adversarial party follows the protocol specification, except that it refuses to choose truly random coins, and instead sets its random tape to some fixed/deterministic value -say, the all 0 string. This adversarial model is much weaker than the fully malicious one, making our negative results stronger. We will also only consider one-sided security against an honest-but-deterministic Bob, but not require any security against an adversarial Alice. Again, this weakening of the security model makes our results stronger. Lastly, we consider offline/online protocols Π = (Π off , Π on ), comprising of two phases:
• The offline phase protocol Π off is run independently of the inputs xA, xB and it allows the parties to do some preprocessing. Both parties receive their respective inputs only after the end of the offline phase.
• The online phase protocol Π on is run by the parties using their inputs xA, xB and any state retained from the offline phase. It results in Bob outputting y = f (xA, xB).
We can think of standard SFE protocols as only containing an online phase. We will give a lower-bound on the communication complexity of the online phase in an offline/online protocol, no matter how much communication takes place in the online phase.
The execution of a protocol Π = (Π off , Π on ) between Alice and honest-but-deterministic Bob defines a random variable for Bob's view of the protocol: (detview Bob in the offline phase, and the online part consists of Bob's input and the protocol messages from Alice to Bob in the online phase. The protocol messages chosen by Alice follow the protocol with true randomness, while those from Bob follow the protocol with the random tape set to the all 0s string.
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Definition 2. We say that an offline/online two-party pro-
L with security against honest-but-deterministic Bob, if there exists a simulator S = (S off , S on ) such that for all xA ∈ {0, 1}
where (sim
Remark 1. A crucial but subtle aspect of the above definition for offline/online SFE is that the simulator S off must simulate the offline phase without knowing Bob's input xB or the output f (xA, xB). For example, this is required if the inputs can be chosen (e.g., by the adversary/environment) adaptively after the offline phase. In fact, our lower bound in Section 4.2 can be overcome if the simulator is allowed to know the output when simulating the offline part. Indeed Yao garbled circuits (discussed further in Section 4.3) give such an offline/online protocol with low communication complexity in the online part if the offline simulator is given the output.
POSITIVE RESULTS IN THE HONEST-BUT-CURIOUS SETTING
We now describe our positive results, giving general SFE protocols in the honest-but-curious setting, whose communication complexity is independent of the output size of the function being computed. As explained in the introduction, we will rely on a new type of security for hash functions and we begin by describing this new primitive.
Somewhere Statistically Binding Hash Functions
Definition. A somewhere statistically binding (SSB) hash function allows us to create a short hash y = H hk (x) of some long value x = (x[0], . . . , x[L − 1]) and later efficiently "prove" that the i'th block of x takes on some particular value x[i] = u by providing a short opening π. The size of the hash y = H hk (x), the size of the opening π and the time to verify π should be bounded by some fixed polynomials in the security parameter and unrelated to the potentially huge size of x. So far, this problem can be solved using Merkle Trees, where such an opening consists of the hash values of all the sibling nodes along the path from the root of the tree to the i'th leaf. However, the definition of SSB hash has an additional statistical requirement: it allows us to choose the hashing key hk with respect to some special "binding index" i in such a way that the hash y = H hk (x) is statistically binding on the i'th block of the input, meaning 7 Our results would hold even if we modified the definition so that an honest-but-deterministic Bob uses true randomness in the offline phase but is deterministic in the online phase. We choose to omit this for simplicity.
that • hk ← Gen(1 λ , L, i) takes as input an integer L ≤ 2 λ and index i ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1} (both of these are in binary) and outputs a public hashing key hk.
• H hk : Σ L → {0, 1} hash is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm that takes as input
hash .
• π ← Open(hk, x, j): Given the hash key hk, x ∈ Σ L and an index j ∈ {0, . . . , L−1}, creates an opening π ∈ {0, 1} opn .
• Verify(hk, y, j, u, π): Given a hash key hk and a value y ∈ {0, 1} hash , an integer index j ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1}, a value u ∈ Σ and an opening π ∈ {0, 1} opn , outputs a decision ∈ {accept, reject}. This is intended to verify that a preimage x of y = H hk (x) has x[j] = u.
We require the following properties:
Index Hiding: We consider the following game between an attacker A and a challenger:
• The attacker A(1 λ ) chooses an integer L and two indices i0, i1 ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1}.
• The challenger chooses a bit b ← {0, 1} and sets hk ← Gen(1 λ , L, i b ).
• The attacker A gets hk and outputs a bit b .
We require that for any ppt attacker A we have
| ≤ negl(λ) in the above game.
Somewhere Statistically Binding: We say that hk is statistically binding for an index i if there do not exist any values y, u = u , π, π s.t. Verify(hk, y, i, u, π) = Verify(hk, y, i, u , π ) = accept. We require that for any integers L ≤ 2 λ , i ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1} the key hk ← Gen(1 λ , L, i) is statistically binding for i.
Remark 2.
Notice that the output size and the opening size of SSB hash are bounded by some fixed polynomials hash , opn and independent of the size of the input x. Also, we note that an SSB hash function is necessarily collision resistant. Intuitively, if an attacker can find x = x such that H hk (x) = H hk (x ) then there must be some index i such that x[i] = x [i] and therefore the attacker knows with certainty that the key hk is not binding on index i. This would contradict index hiding. We only make an informal note of this and do not explicitly rely on this property. Finally, note that achieving both the property of statistical binding for a specific index and efficient local opening is what makes constructing an SSB hash non-trivial. Overview of Construction. Our construction combines the ideas behind Merkle Hash Trees with fully homomorphic encryption (FHE, a formal definition is given in the full version). Let's assume we want to hash some data
α is a power-of-2. We construct a full binary tree of height α sitting on top of the data x. Each node of the tree is associated with a ciphertext under an FHE scheme. The L leaf nodes are associated with encryptions of x[0] , . . . , x[L − 1] respectively, where these ciphertexts are computed deterministically using some fixed random coins. The hashing key hk ← Gen(1 λ , L, i) consists of an encrypted path in the tree going to a leaf i. Hashing will consist of homomorphically computing a ciphertext for each node of the tree using the ciphertexts associated with its children and the ciphertexts contained in hk. This is done in a way that ensures that all of the ciphertexts on the path from the root to leaf i contain encryptions of x[i]. The output of the hash function is the ciphertext associated with the root of the tree, which is an encryption of x[i] and therefore statistically committing to this value. Analogously to Merkle Trees, opening the hash for some particular block i consists of revealing the ciphertexts associated with all of the siblings along the path from the root to i, which is sufficient to recompute the ciphertext associated with the root. One difficulty is that an adversarial opening may consist of "incorrectly generated ciphertexts" and we cannot guarantee the correctness of homomorphic evaluation over such ciphertexts. Therefore, homomorphic evaluation will only operate on the honestly generated ciphertexts provided as part of the hashing key hk, while the ciphertexts associated with the nodes of the tree will only be used to define the function being evaluated.
Construction. Let E = (KeyGen, Enc, Dec, Eval) be an FHE scheme. For any polynomial block-size blk = blk (λ), we construct an SSB hash function (Gen, H, Open, Verify) with alphabet Σ = {0, 1} blk as follows.
• hk ← Gen(1 λ , L, i): Assume w.l.o.g. that L = 2 α is a power-of-2 for some integer α ≤ λ. For j = 0, . . . , α: create (pkj, skj) ← KeyGen(1 λ ). Let (bα, . . . , b1) be the binary representation of the index i ∈ {0, . . . , 2 α − 1}.
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For j = 1, . . . , α, compute cj ← Enc pk j ((skj−1, bj)). Let hk = (pk0, . . . , pkα, c1, . . . , cα).
). Let T be a binary tree of height α with L leaves. We think of the leaves as being at level 0 and the root of the tree as being at level α. We inductively and deterministically associate a ciphertext ctv with each vertex v ∈ T . Intuitively, the encrypted bits bj contained in hk will ensure that the data item x[i] is propagated up the tree in encrypted form. Formally, we define the ciphertexts ctv inductively as follows:
-If v is the j'th leaf, we associate to it the ciphertext ctv := Enc pk 0 (x[j];0) to be a deterministically computed encryption of x[j] using fixed randomness0.
-Let v ∈ T be a non-leaf vertex at level j ∈ [α] with children v0, v1 having associated ciphertexts ct0, ct1, and let cj be the ciphertext contained in hk for level j. We associate with v the ciphertext ctv = Eval pk j (fct 0 ,ct 1 , cj) 9 It is useful to think of the bits bi as tracing out a path in a binary tree going from the root to the leaf i.
where we define the function:
Note that the function fct 0 ,ct 1 is homomorphically evaluated only over the ciphertext cj = Enc pk j ((skj−1, bj)) contained in hk, whereas the ciphertexts ct0, ct1 only serve to define the function being evaluated. The output ciphertext ctv is an encryption under the key pkj.
The above ensures that for any node v which lies on the path from the root to the leaf at the statistically binding index i, the associated ciphertext ctv is an encryption of x[i]. The output of the hash is the ciphertext ctv where v is the root of the tree T .
• Open(hk, x, j): Perform the computation of H hk (x) as described above and output the ciphertexts ctv for each vertex v that's a sibling of some vertex along the path from the root to the leaf at position j.
• Verify(hk, y, j, u, π): Perform the computation of H hk (x) as described above using only the provided ciphertexts.
In particular, for each vertex v along the path from the root of the tree to leaf j, inductively compute a ciphertext ctv. In the base case, when v is the j'th leaf, set ctv = Enc pk 0 (u;0). Otherwise, if v is not a leaf, then one of its children lies on the path to leaf j in which case the corresponding ciphertext was computed in the previous step, and the sibling ciphertex is provided in the opening π. Therefore, we can compute ctv = Eval pk j (fct 0 ,ct 1 , cj) where ct0, ct1 are the ciphertexts associated with the children of v and cj is contained in the hash key hk. Finally, compute the ciphertext ctv associated with the root of the tree and check that y ? = ctv.
is an FHE scheme then, for any polynomial block-size blk (λ), the above construction (Gen, H, Open, Verify) is an SSB hash with blockalphabet Σ = {0, 1}
blk .
Proof (sketch).
To argue index hiding security, we use the semantic security of the FHE scheme. For the somewhere statistically binding property, we rely on correctness of the homomorphic evaluation of the FHE scheme. A complete proof is given in the full version.
One-Sided SFE for Multi-Decryption
In the introduction, we gave an example of a functionality where Alice has a short secret key, Bob has a large encrypted database and we want Bob to learn the decryption without learning anything else about Alice's secret key. We now show how to do this in the honest-but-curious setting with communication complexity independent of the database size. Then, in the next section, we will leverage this protocol to build general SFE schemes.
Multi-Decryption.
Let E = (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) be a bit-encryption scheme with ciphertext size ctx = ctx(λ). We begin by describing an SFE protocol for the "multidecryption" functionality where Alice has as input a secret key sk ∈ {0, 1} sk and Bob has as input some "database" of L ciphertexts c0, . . . , cL−1 ∈ {0, 1} ctx where L is some polynomial in the security parameter. The functionality gives Bob the decryptions m0 = Dec sk (c0), . . . , mL−1 = Dec sk (cL−1) with mi ∈ {0, 1}. In other words, we want an SFE for the function f E,L multi-dec (sk, (c0, . . . , cL−1)) = (m0, . . . , mL−1) where Bob gets the output. We only ask for one-sided security against an honest-but-curious Bob and do not require any security against a corrupt Alice -she may learn something about Bob's ciphertexts c0, . . . , cL−1 during the course of the protocol.
Our protocol makes use of an SSB hash function H = (Gen, H, Open, Verify) with alphabet Σ = {0, 1} blk where blk := ctx + 1. Assume the SSB hash has some corresponding output size hash and opening size opn (all polynomials in the security parameter λ). The protocol relies on an indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) scheme O (see the full version for a formal definition). The protocol is given in Figure 1 .
multi-dec (sk, (c0, . . . , cL−1)) = (m0, . . . , mL−1).
• Alice chooses hk ← Gen(1 λ , L, 0) and sends hk to Bob.
• Bob chooses randomness (r0, . .
L . Bob computes y ← H hk (x) and sends y to Alice.
• Alice creates a circuit C = C[hk, y, sk] as described below and obfuscates it by computing C ← O(1 λ , C).
She sends C to Bob.
• For i = 0, . . . , L−1, Bob computes πi = Open(hk, x, i) and mi := C(i, ci, ri, π). Given values hk (hash key), y (hash output) and sk (decryption key) define the circuit C = C[hk, y, sk] as follows.
C[hk, y, sk](i, c, r, π): Hard-coded: hash key hk, hash value y, decryption key sk.
ctx , r ∈ {0, 1}, π ∈ {0, 1} opn . 1. If Verify(hk, y, i, (c, r), π) = accept output 0. 2. Output Dec sk (c).
In addition, we assume that the circuit C includes some polynomial-size padding to make it sufficiently large. In particular, we also define an augmented circuit C aug = C aug [hk, y, sk, k, i * ] below, which is not used in the protocol, but is used in the proof of security. We will need to pad C so that its size matches that of C aug . For the definition of C aug , we assume that f k (x) is a PRF with key k ∈ {0, 1} λ , input x ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1} and output f k (x) ∈ {0, 1}.
Theorem 2. If H is an SSB hash and O is an iO scheme then Protocol 1 is a secure SFE for the functionality f E,L multi-dec with one-sided security against an honest-but-curious Bob. Furthermore, for any choice of encryption scheme E, there is some polynomial p(λ) such that for every polynomial L(λ) the communication complexity of the above protocol for the functionality f E,L multi-dec is bounded by p(λ) and is independent of L(λ).
Proof (sketch). In order to simulate the view of an honest-but-curious Bob, the simulator uses the PRF to generate Bob's random coins, generates a new hashing key, and obfuscates the program C aug [hk, y, ⊥, k, i * = L] containing ⊥ in place of Alice's secret key sk. As discussed in the introduction, we show by a sequence of carefully constructed hybrids that the simulated view and real view are indistinguishable. We leverage the information theoretical guarantee of the SSB hash that allows us to rely on indistinguishability obfuscation, rather than on differing inputs obfuscation. A complete proof is given in the full version.
General SFE Constructions
We now leverage the protocol for multi-decryption from the previous section to get generic SFE protocols in the honest-but-curious setting. Let
be any efficiently computable function with A, B , L being some polynomials in the security parameter λ. We focus on SFE schemes where Alice has input xA, Bob has input xB and Bob learns the output y = f (xA, xB). We give two constructions. The first one achieves communication complexity poly(λ) + A(λ), where poly(λ) is some fixed polynomial independent of the choice of f or its parameters. In particular, the communication complexity only depends on Alice's input size A but is independent of Bob's input-size B or output-size L. The second construction achieves communication complexity poly(λ)CC(π, λ) where CC(π, λ) is the communication complexity of an arbitrary insecure protocol π for evaluating the function f and poly(λ) is some fixed polynomial independent of the choice of f or its parameters. Since there is always a simple insecure protocol where Alice sends her input to Bob, we have CC(π, λ) ≤ A(λ) and in general, it may be much smaller than Alice's input size. Unfortunately, in this construction we pay with a multiplicative polynomial overhead rather than an additive one as before.
First Construction. Let E = (KeyGen, Enc, Dec, Eval, Rerand) be an FHE scheme with rerandomization. As discussed in the full version, by relying on hybrid encryption we can assume without loss of generality that a ciphertext produced by c ← Enc pk (x) is of size |x| + poly(λ), meaning that there is only an additive polynomial overhead. Our protocol is given in Figure 2 .
Theorem 3. Assuming that E = (KeyGen, Enc, Dec, Eval, Rerand) is an FHE scheme with rerandomization, and that the conditions of Theorem 2 (Protocol 1) hold, Protocol 2 gives a secure SFE scheme for any polynomial-time computable functionality f . Furthermore, there is some fixed polynomial p(λ) such that for every such functionality f where Alice's input size is A(λ), the communication complexity of the protocol is given by p(λ) + A(λ).
Proof (sketch). Protocol 2 can be simulated by relying on semantic security of the FHE scheme, the security of the rerandomization, and the simulation-security of Protocol 1. A complete proof is given in the full version.
be any (insecure) protocol between Alice and Bob that evaluates the function y = f (xA, xB) so that Bob learns y at the
Alice has input xA, Bob has input xB and Bob learns y = f (xA, xB).
• Alice computes (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1 λ ), cA ← Enc pk (xA) and sends pk, cA to Bob.
• Bob computes cout = Eval pk (f (·, xB), cA). Bob chooses a "one-time-pad" k ← {0, 1} L and sets c pad = Eval pk (OTP k , cout) where OTP k (y) := y ⊕ k. Finally, Bob computes c f rsh ← Rerand pk (c pad ). Let c f rsh = (c0, . . . , cL−1) where ci are bit-encryptions.
• Alice and Bob execute Protocol 1 for the functionality f E,L multi-dec where Alice has input sk and Bob has input c f rsh = (c0, . . . , cL−1). Bob receives the output z ∈ {0, 1} L and sets y := k ⊕ z as the output of the protocol. end of the protocol. We assume that it has some fixed round complexity q = q(λ) and fixed communication-length in each round, independent of the particular inputs. Without loss of generality, the protocol π works as follows: Alice and Bob start out with a state that just consists of their inputs state Our SFE protocol will rely on the idea of "double encryption" using two FHE public keys pkA, pkB and ciphertexts of the form c = Enc pk B (Enc pk A (x)). To simplify notation, we let Eval pk B ,pk A (f, c) denote Eval pk B (Eval pk A (f, ·), c). This corresponds to a homomorphic evaluation of the function f on the message x hidden under two layers of encryption. In particular if c is as above and c * = Eval pk B ,pk A (f, c) then
The main idea of our construction is to execute the protocol π under two layers of FHE encryption with public keys pkA, pkB chosen by Alice and Bob respectively. 10 The protocol is given in Figure 3 .
Theorem 4. Assume that E = (KeyGen, Enc, Dec, Eval, Rerand) is an FHE scheme with rerandomization, and that the conditions of Theorem 2 (Protocol 1) hold. Let f be any polynomial-time functionality and let π be any (insecure) protocol correctly evaluating f with communication complexity CC(π, λ). Then Protocol 3 gives a secure SFE scheme for f . Furthermore, there is some fixed polynomial p(λ) such that for every choice of f and π as above, the communication complexity of Protocol 3 is bounded by p(λ)CC(π, λ).
Proof (sketch). Protocol 3 can be simulated by relying on semantic security of the FHE scheme, the security of the rerandomization, and the simulation-security of Protocol 1. A complete proof is given in the full version.
• Alice chooses (pkA, skA) ← KeyGen(1 λ ) and sends pkA to Bob. Bob chooses (pkB, skB) ← KeyGen(1 λ ) and sends pkB to Alice.
• Alice locally computes a double-encryption c Output for Alice. Note that our positive results also extend to the case where both Alice and Bob get the same output y or where they get different outputs yA, yB respectively. In particular, we can just run two sequential copies of our SFE where we reverse the roles of Alice and Bob. Using the first construction, this results in communication complexity poly(λ) + |xA| + |xB|. Using the second construction, this results in communication complexity poly(λ)CC(π, λ) where CC(π, λ) is now the communication complexity of any insecure protocol π evaluating f where both Alice and Bob get their correct outputs.
LOWER BOUNDS IN THE HONEST-BUT-DETERMINISTIC SETTING
We now give a lower bound for communication complexity of offline/online SFE in the presence of honest-but-deterministic adversaries. In particular, we show that the online communication complexity in any such SFE protocol must exceed the Yao incompressibility entropy of the output distribution of the evaluated function f .
Yao Incompressibility Entropy
The traditional notion of Shannon entropy corresponds to how well a distribution can be compressed (on average). The notion of Yao incompressibility entropy [25, 19] extends this to the computational setting by measuring how well a distribution can be compressed when the compressor and decompressor are required to be efficient. Roughly speaking, the Yao incompressibility entropy of a distribution X is at least k if X cannot be efficiently compressed to fewer than k bits. We will rely on a version of conditional Yao incompressibility entropy due to Hsiao, Lu and Reyzin [19] . It was shown by [19] that the (conditional) Yao incompressibility entropy of a distribution X is always at least as large as its HILL pseudo-entropy [18] , which is in turn at least as large as its min-entropy, and the gaps between these entropies can be large. Therefore, giving a lower bound in terms of Yao entropy yields the strongest results.
Definition 4. Let k = k(λ) be an integer-valued function of security parameter λ. A probability ensemble X = {X λ } λ∈N has Yao incompressibility entropy at least k conditioned on Z = {Z λ } λ∈N , denoted by H Yao (X|Z) ≥ k, if for every pair of circuit-ensembles C = {C λ }, D = {D λ } (called "compressor" and "decompressor") of size poly(λ) where C λ has output-size at most k(λ) − 1, there exists a negligible function ε(·) such that
We note that the above definition is actually somewhat weaker than the one of [19] . The latter required that, if the output of the compressor has length , then the success probability of the compressor/decompressor should be at most 2 −k +ε(λ). In our case, we only require this to hold for = k − 1. Since considering a weaker definition makes our lower bound stronger, we will use our weaker variant which is also simpler to define and use.
Let
. We define the Yao incompressibility entropy of the function f as a natural extension of the concept of the above Yao incompressibility entropy for probability ensembles (Definition 4). In particular, it measures the incompressibility of Bob's output Y = f (XA, XB) conditioned on Bob's input XB, for the choice of distributions XA, XB which maximizes this quantity.
Definition 5. We say that a function f :
• a probability ensemble XA = {X A,λ } λ∈N of distributions over {0, 1} A (λ) and
• a probability ensemble
i.e., the Yao incompressibility entropy of Y conditioned on XB is at least k.
Communication Complexity vs. Incompressibility Entropy
We now show a lower bound on the communication complexity of any (offline/online) SFE protocol evaluating f in the honest-but-deterministic setting in terms of the Yao incompressibility entropy of f .
Theorem 5. Let f : {0, 1} A (λ) ×{0, 1} B (λ) → {0, 1} L(λ) , and let Π = (Π off , Π on ) be an offline/online protocol evaluating f with one-sided security against honest-but-deterministic Bob. If the Yao incompressibility entropy of f is H Yao (f ) ≥ k then the communication complexity from Alice to Bob during the online phase of Π is at least k.
Proof (sketch). The simulator for any protocol for f (secure against an honest-but-deterministic Bob) with communication complexity lower than k can be used to construct an efficient compressor/decompressor pair contradicting the Yao incompressibility entropy of f . A complete proof is given in the full version.
As an immediate corollary, we get that the communication complexity during the online phase must be at least as large as the output-size for any functionality with pseudorandom output. For example, we state the following for the example of PRF evaluation discussed in Section 1.1.
λ → {0, 1}} k∈{0,1} λ be a pseudorandom function. Consider an SFE functionality for "L PRF Evaluations" where Alice has a key k ∈ {0, 1} λ , Bob has no input, and Bob gets the output y = (f k (1), . . . , f k (L)) for some polynomial L = L(λ). In any offline/online protocol Π = (Π off , Π on ) for the above functionality, with one-sided security against honest-but-deterministic Bob, the online communication from Alice to Bob must be at least L bits.
Extension to Multi-Party SFE. Our negative results also extend to multi-party SFE. In particular, for an nparty functionality (y1, . . . , yn) = f (x1, . . . , xn) where party Pi has input xi and output yi, we can define the i'th output entropy of f as being at least k if there exists some distribution (X1, . . . , Xn) such that H Yao (Yi|Xi) ≥ k where Y = f (X1, . . . , Xn). In that case, in any offline/online nparty SFE protocol that has one-sided security against a single honest-but-deterministic party Pi, the communicationcomplexity from all other parties to Pi must be at least k bits. This simply follows by thinking of party Pi as Bob and thinking of all of the other parties as Alice in a two-party SFE protocol.
Applications
Lower Bounds for Functional Encryption The impossibility of functional encryption with simulation based security for general circuits was first shown by Agrawal et al. [1] . This result was later extended to prove lower bounds for various related notions of functional encryption [10, 9, 16] . In the full version we show that the above lower bounds for functional encryption follow from our lower bound on communication complexity in offline/online SFE secure against honest-but-deterministic Bob.
Lower Bounds for Garbled Circuits In the full version we also discuss the known lower bounds for garbled circuits [3, 17, 14] that follow from our lower bound on communication complexity of offline/online SFE from Section 4.2.
CONCLUSIONS
We explored the communication complexity of SFE for functions with long output. We showed that the honest-butcurious setting allows for general protocols whose communication is smaller than the output size while the malicious or even honest-but-deterministic settings do not. There are several interesting open problems left to explore. One interesting problem would be to consider weaker security notions than simulation-based security. For example, perhaps we get around "output-size dependence" in the malicious setting if we allowed for an unbounded or super-polynomial simulator. We leave this question for future work.
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